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Introduction: The Government of Egypt has embarked on a process of reforming 
health care financing in the country. Under the influence of external advisers it has so 
far focused on social health insurance as the main funding mechanism. Other 
options, in particular tax-based financing, have hardly been considered.  
 
Methods: Review of current health care financing arrangements in Egypt, of 
potential areas for improvement, and of stated health policy goals. Analysis of social 
health insurance and taxation-based financing on their ability to meet the stated 
policy goals and their viability.  
 
Results: Although both funding mechanisms have distinct advantages and 
disadvantages when applied to the Egyptian health system, tax-based financing 
seems better able to meet the official policy goals of the Government of Egypt than 
social health insurance on grounds of efficiency, equity and technical feasibility. 
 
Conclusions:  The Government of Egypt will have to raise public health expenditure 
substantially to finance care at an adequate level. Expanding and refining the present 
tax-based financing scheme, rather than switching to an insurance-based scheme 
seems the technically superior strategy. Other measures to improve the coordination 
of financing, such as the creation of a single fundholding agency, are needed as well 





Hintergrund: Die ägyptische Regierung hat begonnen die Finanzierungs-
mechanismen im Gesundheitssystem zu reformieren. Der Fokus der Überlegungen 
der Regierung und der externen Berater war bisher ein Sozialversicherungssystem. 
Andere Optionen, besonders ein aus Steuern finanziertes Gesundheitssystem, 
wurden bisher nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. 
  
Methoden: Übersicht über derzeitige Finanzierungsmechanismen im ägyptischen 
Gesundheitssystem und Aufzeigen von möglichen Ansatzpunkten für Reformen und 
der gesundheitspolitischen Ziele der Regierung. Vergleichende Analyse des 
Verbesserungspotentials durch eine allgemeine Sozialversicherungspflicht oder eine 
Finanzierung aus Steuermitteln. Die offiziellen gesundheitspolitischen Ziele der 
Regierung werden dabei neben der technischen und politischen Umsetzbarkeit als 
Kriterien verwendet.   
 
Ergebnisse: Obwohl beide Finanzierungsmechanismen im Kontext des ägyptischen 
Gesundheitssystems unterschiedliche Vor- und Nachteile bieten, scheint eine 
Finanzierung aus Steuermitteln die geeignetere Finanzierungsart um die 
gesundheitspolitischen Ziele der Regierung wie Effizienz und Gerechtigkeit 
nachhaltig zu erreichen.   
 
Empfehlungen:  Zum einen müsste die ägyptische Regierung die öffentliche 
Finanzierung des Gesundheitssystems deutlich erhöhen um eine adäquate 
Gesundheitsversorgung der Bevölkerung zu gewährleisten. Zum anderen scheint 
eine Ausweitung und Präzision des bestehenden steuerfinanzierten Systemanteils 
einer Ausweitung des Sozialversicherungsanteils die technisch überlegene Strategie 
zu sein. Andere flankierende Massnahmen wie die Schaffung einer zentralen 
Koordinationsstelle für die Gesundheitssystemfinanzierung und eine verbesserte 
Regulierung der privaten Anbieter und des Marktes für pharmazeutische Produkte 






The Government of Egypt has declared health a national priority and currently 
considers policies to reform health care financing (1). After embarking on economic 
liberalisation during the 1990s, Egypt has received considerable amounts of foreign 
aid and assistance to restructure its health care system, notably by the World Bank, 
USAID, and the European Commission. The technical assistance was predominantly 
provided by American for-profit consultancies subcontracted by USAID.  More 
recently European non-profit consultancies have also been involved. The health 
reforms envisaged by the Western consultants were so far heavily focussed on a 
social health insurance funding model.  Other options for health care financing have 
so far not figured prominently in publicly available documents. In this paper funding 
the Egyptian health system through social insurance is compared to funding through 
taxation, which is the other main alternative. The feasibility of expanding private 
health insurance has been dealt with elsewhere in detail.  
 
The paper begins with an overview of the Egyptian health care system and its 
political and socioeconomic environment. Next, current issues in health care 
financing are highlighted and policy goals are specified. The subsequent section 
analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the two main alternative sources of 
finance, social insurance and taxation, with respect to their ability to achieve stated 
policy goals and their viability. The paper concludes with a number of 
recommendations to reform health care funding in Egypt. Health service delivery 
issues are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
5 2. Background 
 
2.1. Political and socioeconomic environment 
 
With 67.3 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous country of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) (2). According to World Bank criteria, Egypt is a lower-
middle income country (3). Currently 35% of its population are under 15 years of age, 
and the workforce totals 28% of the population, with roughly one third employed in 
agriculture and another third employed in the public sector (4). At least 45% of the 
population are urban (6). This is probably an underestimate, as many Egyptian 
"villages" are now the size of small towns. Other sources estimate that 60% of Egypt 
are now urban (5). 
 
After three decades of socialist economy and rapid economic growth, Egypt started 
implementing economic reforms in 1986 to counter a substantial deterioration of 
economic performance due to falling oil prices and economic imbalances (7).  In 
1990 it embarked on a comprehensive structural adjustment programme. Meanwhile 
it has become the very model of a modern emerging market (5). Macroeconomic 
indicators are favourable: a sustained growth rate around 6%, inflation below 4%, a 
budget deficit at 1.3% of GDP (from 15% in 1989), and foreign reserves of US$20.6 
billion (3, 5, 8). However, economic reforms have also given rise to adverse social 
effects, namely the aggravation of poverty and unemployment (9). Measures 
included the reduction of government spending, elimination or reduction of subsidies 
on food and other goods and services, and higher taxes required to attain fiscal 
balance, all of which primarily affect the poor (9). Unemployment was primarily 
caused by restructuring of the public sector and privatisation (9). 
 
In 1990, the number of poor in both urban and rural areas was estimated at 34%, 
defined as persons living below the abject poverty line with a monthly expenditure of 
less than $35 per individual (purchasing power in 1985 prices) according to UNDP 
criteria (10). The improved income of other social groups benefiting from the reforms 
creates larger income discrepancies and further heightens the poverty perception of 
this large segment of the population (9). 
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Officially 14% of the workforce was unemployed in 1995, but when new graduates 
and 1.5 million redundant public sector employees are taken into account, effective 
unemployment adds up to 20% (9). Between 1991 and 1999, public investment in the 
social sector decreased steadily from 1.9% to 1.3% of GDP (4). Public investment in 
health fell from 0.16% in 1991 to 0.04% in 1994, but has since risen to 0.23% of GDP 
in 1999 (4). Detailed data on public expenditures are not available, but total current 
public expenditure decreased from 26.2% in 1994 to 19.4% of GDP in 1999 (8). 
 
There has been no political counterpart to economic liberalisation. Power remains 
centralised, with little authority devolved to local levels (5). The legal and regulatory 
system is a thicket of tens of thousands, sometimes contradictory, laws and decrees, 
dating from different periods including Islamic, French, Ottoman, British, Soviet-
inspired, and recently those favouring a globalised market economy. 
(5).  
 
2.2. Egypt's health care system 
 
Egypt has a complex health system, with many different public and private providers 
and financing agents. There are four main financing agents: i) the government sector 
which is understood in Egypt to refer to the various ministries and departments of the 
government (7); ii) the public sector, consisting of financially autonomous 
organisations owned by the government, the largest being the Health Insurance 
Organisation (HIO) and Curative Care Organisations (CCO); iii) private organisations, 
like private insurance companies, unions, professional organisations, and nonprofit 
NGOs; and iv) households (7, 11). Health care providers in the government sector 
are the Ministry of Health (MOH), teaching and university hospitals, HIO, and the 
Ministries of Interior and Defence. Public providers are HIO, CCO, and other public 
firms. The private sector consists of both nonprofit and profit providers, such as 
private clinics, hospitals and pharmacies (7). NGOs are currently one of the fastest 
growing sectors (11).  
 
In the Egyptian financial year 1995, health spending totalled E£7.5 billion or 3.7% of 
GDP, equivalent to E£127 (US$38) per capita (7). Public financing, mainly from 
7 general taxation, contributed 1.6%, private financing 2.1% of GDP (7). In 1999 
government revenues totalled 23.6% of GDP. Central tax revenues accounted for 
15.6%, transferred profits for 3.2% and other, not-tax revenues for 1.8%. Local 
revenues accounted for 2.9%. Since 1994 total revenues have decreased steadily 
from 30% of GDP, and tax revenues from 17.9%, respectively (8).  
 
Social insurance, which accounted for 18% of public funding (7), is mandatory for 
formal government and company employees, who contribute 0.5 and 1% of their 
base salary, and their employers 1.5 and 3%, respectively (11). 5% of funding was 
raised by firms, private insurance and syndicates, and 51% were spent by 
households (7). Sources of finance are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Egyptian Health Revenues: Sources of finance. Source: (7). 
 
Source of Finance  Percent of Total Health Revenues 
Households 51 
Ministry of Finance  35 
Social insurance contributions  6 
Firms 5 
Foreign donors  3 
 
 
Almost all public monies passed through financial intermediaries before being 
transferred to providers, whereas more than 90% of household expenditures 
consisted of direct out-of-pocket payments to private providers and pharmacies (7). 
There were three major financing channels (7): 
 
1.  From Ministry of Finance (MOF) to MOH facilities through MOH budget 
(E£1337 million). 
2.  From Social Insurance Organisation (E£448 million) and MOF (E£434 million) 
to HIO. 
3.  From households (E£3780 million) directly to private providers and 
pharmacies.  
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The use of funds at provider level is visualised in Table 2. Less than 60% of MOF 
funds were actually spent in MOH facilities (7). The rest was transferred to teaching 
and university hospitals, HIO and CCO. MOH facilities thus only received 19% of all 
health sector resources, or 0.7% of GDP (7). 56% of all resources were spent in the 
private sector, most of it for the purchase of drugs (63%) or paying for private 
ambulatory care (17%). Less than 10% of private funds were used to purchase 
inpatient care (7). 
 
Despite the radical economic policy shift, there has been little change in the overall 
financing and structure of the health system since 1991. The only notable changes 
were the expansion of social insurance coverage to 10 million schoolchildren in 1993 




Table 2. Egyptian Health Expenditure: Use of funds. Source: (7). 
 
Users of Funds  Percent of Total Health Expenditure 
Pharmacies 36% 
Ministry of Health services  19% 
Private providers  18% 
University and teaching hospitals  10% 
Health Insurance Organisation services   8% 
Other private  5% 
Other public   3% 
Non-governmental organisations  1% 
 
 
9 3. Current issues 
 
The Egyptian health system has some strengths, like an extensive infrastructure of 
physicians, clinics and hospitals, availability of technology and pharmaceuticals, and 
excellent physical access to care with 95% of the population being within 5 km reach 
of a medical facility. 
It achieved high immunisation rates and a reduction of annual population growth from 
2.3% in 1990 to 1.8% in 1999 (3, 6). However, the belief that the lowering of the 
Egyptian birth rate is a result of the systematic extension of family planning services 
has been challenged. Evidence seems to suggest, that it is rather a response to the 
country's changing economic, social, and political circumstances (12). 
 
During the period of structural adjustment, there has been continuing concern with 
the government's policies in the social sector, and there has been some recognition 
that performance in the health sector both before and during adjustment has been 
less than adequate (7). The Egyptian health system has been characterised as 
having virtually all the problems encountered in former socialist countries, while at 
the same time possessing few of the advantages and most of the problems of an 
open-ended, US type system (13). 
 
In particular, the following problems have been identified: 
 
  Health status concerns: Although substantial health improvements have occurred 
in the 1980s, like a reduction in child mortality and in infectious diseases (14), 
these have given way to stagnation of health conditions in the 1990s (7). 
Compared to other countries at its income level, Egypt's health indicators were 
and remain poor (7, 15).  
 
  Inequity: Although in theory, the government guarantees "free health care to all" 
(11), there is a huge disparity in financial access to care. The burden of 
households on out-of-pocket spending is greater than in any other country in the 
MENA region, with the exception of Yemen (7). The poor pay relatively more 
(both out-of-pocket and through the tax system) and receive relatively less in 
benefits than the better-off social strata (13). Less than 40% of the general 
10 population, and only 15% of those over 15 years of age benefit from social 
insurance coverage (11, 13). Social insurance with nearly 50% contribution from 
general revenues resembles more a subsidised public finance scheme than a true 
insurance, which only benefits formal sector workers (7), and even excludes 
spouses and children of employees (11). There is also an important geographic 
disparity of service delivery. Utilisation rates for ambulatory and hospital care are 
nearly double in urban compared to rural regions (16).  
 
  Macro-inefficiency: With total health care spending at 3.7% of GDP, Egypt spends 
on the lower side of what is seen in developing countries, and less than most 
countries in the MENA region (7). If government health spending is seen as an 
indicator for its commitment to improve health conditions, Egypt's commitment is 
low compared to its regional comparators (7). 
 
  Micro-inefficiency: Financing and management is completely fragmented with 29 
public agencies involved (13). This precludes efficient and equitable risk pooling 
as well as a consistent policy focus or consistent incentives for efficiency (13). 
The low quality of government and public services is generally acknowledged (7, 
11) . This is evidenced by an estimated 30-40% of nosocomial infections in 
hospitals (13), and 50% of deaths in emergency cases thought to be due to 
improper case management (1). Public health provision is poorly targeted, as the 
focus is on expensive tertiary care. Primary care is mainly left to the private 
sector. Partly due to an employment guarantee for doctors and nurses there is an 
oversupply of providers, but their training is often insufficient (13). More than 80% 
of physicians conduct private clinics in addition to their public employment (17). 
Hospital occupancy rate is below 50% (13). There are too many specialists vs. 
primary care physicians (13), and pharmaceutical consumption and spending is 
50% higher than in comparable countries (13).  
 
  Rising health care costs: Due to an epidemiological transition from infectious to 
non-communicable diseases, a continued high population growth (high birth rate 
and longer life expectancy), and rising expectations of the population through 
access to global communication and commerce, an upward pressure on health 
care costs is expected (1). 
11 4. Policy aims 
 
Guiding goals of any health sector reform are to improve health status and the quality 
of care (18). As these are multidimensional and notoriously difficult to measure, 
policies are better assessed using operational objectives (18). Since policy goals can 
be conflicting there is a need to set priorities (18).  
 
In view of current problems we consider the following objectives priorities for 
successful reform of health care financing in Egypt:  
 
  Improvement of efficiency at the macro and micro level, notably the ability of 
policies to increase revenue while maintaining expenditure control, and analysis 
of incentives for efficiency and quality inherent to policies. 
 
  Reduction of inequity in finance and delivery, notably the ability of policies to 
increase coverage and to improve risk pooling through reduction of out-of-pocket 
expenditures, as well as their ability to meet the needs of the poor in particular.  
 
In addition, the technical and political feasibility of policies will be assessed, notably 
the administrative and institutional capacity to carry out policies, and the acceptability 
of reforms to users, health professionals and politicians. 
 





12 5. Options for reform 
 
Health care financing options can be classified according to i) source of finance 
(voluntary and compulsory/public), ii) management of finance, and iii) provider 
payment methods (19, 20). Of the many possible subsystems resulting of 
combinations of these mechanisms, only a few seem suitable as main components of 
health care financing in Egypt. As detailed above, the current system relies mainly on 
the combination of a voluntary, out-of-pocket model and a public integrated model. 
The dominant model in many OECD countries is a public contract model (20). This 
seems also a feasible option in Egypt, which not only has the potential to improve 
efficiency and equity of health services, but also to recycle out-of-pocket 
expenditures into the public system, which has been considered the greatest 
challenge for reform (13). The weaknesses and strengths of different ways of funding 
such a model will be analysed here. The possible role of voluntary health insurance 
or compulsory saving accounts in Egypt is very limited, and has been reviewed 
elsewhere in detail (11). 
 
5.1. Social-insurance-based financing 
 
Macro-efficiency: Compared to systems financed through general taxation, there is in 
general less political resistance to raising social insurance contributions (21). This 
would make it easier for the government to increase revenue for public health 
spending. However, social insurance, being effectively a payroll tax, can increase 
labour costs (21), which might not be desirable in the actual context of economic 
reforms and encourage the non-reporting of economic activity (22). Independence of 
the management of finance from government control and state budget, which is a key 
feature of social insurance schemes, leads to loss of governmental control of 
expenditure. This has proven to be particularly problematic in CEE and CIS 
countries, who experienced an increase in costs after the introduction of social 
insurance and large deficits of funds, which had to be covered by the state budget 
(22). Some are now considering reverting to tax-based schemes (22). Likewise a 
number of southern European countries recently changed their finance systems from 
13 social insurance to general taxation, mainly because of difficulties to control 
expenditure (23). 
 
Micro-efficiency: In contrast to out-of-pocket payments, social insurance, like any 
form of third party payment mechanism, will lead to consumer moral hazard. Even 
under the current, low-quality HIO scheme a significant increase in utilisation is 
observable when compared to no insurance (16). Whether this increased use as 
compared to a perfect market is inefficient is very controversial (24). Provider moral 
hazard is frequently observed in social insurance systems (21), but this is thought to 
be related to fee-for-service payment of providers often associated with social 
insurance, rather than to the funding mechanism. In general, social insurance 
systems deliver high-quality care (21), but this might essentially be due to the fact 
that it is the system employed in the world's richest countries with high overall 
spending on healthcare and high living standards. Competition between providers, 
and even between funds can be incorporated in the design of such a system, when 
consumer choice of provider and/or fund is given and money follows patients. If 
competition between multiple funds is permitted, care has to be taken to prevent risk 
selection by funds and adverse selection by consumers. Administrative costs are 
likely to be higher than for a tax-based financing scheme. 
 
Equity: According to the ability to pay principle, social insurance systems tend to be 
equitable to a certain extent, as contributions are usually related to income (21). 
However, most social insurance systems fund health care in a regressive way, since 
contributions are calculated as a flat percentage of salary and there is often a ceiling, 
resulting in comparatively lower contributions for the better-off (22). In Europe, no 
social-insurance-financed system has achieved complete universal coverage, since 
cover follows entitlement based on some criterion relating to contributions (22). Thus 
inequality of access is present, and especially targeting the poor which should be a 
priority for Egypt is not a strength of these systems. In addition, in some countries 
with multiple insurance funds benefits vary between funds (22), which is counter the 
principle of equal care for equal need.  
 
Feasibility: In all insurance-financed systems ways have to be found to cover non-
contributing individuals. This is likely to be an important obstacle to social insurance 
14 funding in Egypt, as for every contributing individual working in the formal sector, 
there are 5 non-contributing individuals. It is worth noting, that under the current HIO 
scheme even close dependants are not eligible (11). Even in high-income countries 
using social insurance financing schemes, 20-40% of total health care spending are 
funded through the state budget from general taxation (22). Payment compliance 
problems are likely to arise as a result of the increased financial burden on state and 
private employers. In CEE and CIS countries large arrears in social insurance 
contributions have been accumulated by employers (22). Administrative capacity to 
manage a social-insurance scheme in Egypt is considered limited (13), and lack of 
adequate information systems, lack of technical expertise in insurance management, 
lack of institutional infrastructure and an inadequate regulatory framework may 
further impede viability of insurance-based financing in Egypt. For example, 95% of 
small enterprises, which employ 75% of the non-agricultural labour force, do not have 
bank accounts (5). In contrast to its weak technical feasibility, social insurance is 
likely to be highly acceptable to better-off citizens and politicians in favour of current 
economic reforms for its dissimilarity to previous state financing, and to health care 
professionals because of expected higher earnings.  
 
5.2. Tax-based financing 
 
Macro-efficiency: Health systems financing through general taxation tends to restrict 
the overall level of health care funding to one below the level generated by social 
insurance (21). With respect to cost containment and the expected rise of health care 
costs, this can be considered a clear advantage. However, raising revenue for health 
purposes may be more difficult, as taxpayers seem more resistant to increases in 
general taxes compared to insurance contributions earmarked for health (21). This 
could partly be compensated by the introduction of complementary, hypothecated 
taxes on income or consumption.  
 
Micro-efficiency: Addressing the fragmentation of Egyptian financing and 
organisational structures seems easier under a tax-based scheme than under 
insurance-based financing. Quality issues traditionally considered associated with 
finance through the state budget, notably the lack of incentives for efficiency, can 
partly be overcome by introducing quasi-market mechanisms like a purchaser-
15 provider split, by allowing competition between providers, and by devolving financial 
autonomy to local units. The quality issue is also watered by the fact that countries 
with health care financing through general taxation mostly follow a public integrated 
model, and efficiency problems encountered in these systems may rather be related 
to public provision of services than to the finance mechanism. Administrative costs 
are likely to be lower than under an insurance-based scheme. 
 
Equity: In contrast to insurance-based systems, entitlement is based on citizenship or 
residence, and universal coverage as well as risk pooling is generally achieved in 
countries with tax-based health funding (22). The equitable distribution of the 
financial burden according to the ability to pay principle will depend on the 
progressivity of the overall taxation system (21). Funding from direct taxes is usually 
progressive (25). In contrast, indirect taxes are mildly regressive (26). For earmarked 
taxes, opportunities to modify equity characteristics of the financing system are 
greater than for general taxation, as policies to change the latter effect the whole tax 
system (26). In general, formal financial barriers to care do not exist in tax-financed 
systems, which contributes to equity on the delivery side (21). Targeting the poor in 
designing such a system seems easier than in an insurance-based system. However, 
with less funds available for the overall system, rationing of services may be more 
prominent, and can contribute to discrimination of special groups, especially the poor 
rural population (21).  
 
Feasibility: The technical feasibility of a tax-based finance system is excellent, as 
such a system is already in place and both the administrative and institutional 
capacity to administer such a scheme are present. The political feasibility depends 
on the acceptability of the taxes. Earmarking taxes for health purposes can increase 
acceptability to contributors (21). Furthermore, the tax burden has steadily been 
reduced since 1994 by 2.3% of GDP (8). Thus raising taxes is likely to be more 
acceptable than in countries where taxes have recently been increased. Acceptability 
to politicians will be mixed, but in view of a current tendency to counterbalance or 
slow the market-oriented reforms (27) sticking to tax-based health care financing may 
be more acceptable than introducing a new scheme.  
 
 
16 6. Recommendations 
 
To address some of the health care financing issues reviewed, the Government of 
Egypt will have to raise public health expenditure substantially to finance care at an 
adequate level. On the basis of this analysis of main funding alternatives, we 
recommend to expand and refine the present tax-based finance scheme, rather than 
to switch to an insurance-based scheme as has been recommended by other 
organisations (1, 13). In the current situation, funding through taxes seems superior 
to social insurance on grounds of efficiency, equity and technical feasibility. 
Increasing revenue will be a major challenge, and could be addressed by expanding 
the use of hypothecated taxes in addition to the existing, minimal sin tax on nicotine. 
The current mandatory social insurance scheme for formal workers could be 
continued alongside to finance the public scheme, but separate provision and 
associated privileges should be discontinued since they decrease the solidarity of the 
overall scheme. Additional measures related to the source of finance will be needed, 
like a discontinuation of the current policy to allow companies to opt out of the social 
insurance scheme. In order to maintain the better-off contributors in the public 
financing scheme, only complementary voluntary insurance should be permitted.  
 
User charges in the public sector should be kept at a minimum, since they represent 
the most regressive form of health care financing and since they are not a very 
powerful policy tool to improve efficiency nor to contain costs (22), and exempting the 
poor is very difficult (28). If permitted at all, facilities should be allowed to retain them 
to improve quality of services (29). Out-of-pocket payments in the private sector 
should be regulated and ways should be sought to replace them in the long run by 
other provider payment methods, e.g. capitation, under a public contract model.  
 
Increasing health expenditure and reform of sources of funding alone will of course 
not be sufficient to address all issues raised. The management of finance has to be 
better coordinated, which could be achieved by creating a single, fundholding agency 
with greater purchasing power. Ways have to be found to bind private providers into 
the public finance system, possibly through a public contract model, in order to 
recycle the large amount of out-of-pocket expenditures into the public system and to 
create incentives for efficiency and quality, for example through changes in provider 
17 payment methods. Other accompanying measures, like divesting inefficient public 
facilities, abolishing employment guarantees for doctors and nurses, limiting medical 
school enrolment, introducing quality assurance mechanisms, and improved 
regulation of the pharmaceutical market are equally important.  
 
Finally, health sector reforms cannot be seen in isolation. Other important 
determinants of health, such as education, safe water and sanitation, housing and 
traffic regulations have to be developed in order to achieve a significant impact on 





1.  Partnerships for Health Reform. “A new Egyptian Health Care Model for the 
21st Century,” . Bethesda, MD and Cairo: Partnerships for Health Reform for 
the Ministry of Health and Population of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1999. 
2.  US Bureau of the Census. “International Data Base,” . Washington, USA: US 
Bureau of the Census, International Programs Center, 1998. 
3.  World Bank. “Egypt, Arab Republic at a glance,” . Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1999. 
4.  Ministry of Economy. “Quarterly Economic Digest Oct.-Dec. 1999,” . Cairo: 
Ministry of Economy, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000. 
5.  The Economist. “A survey of Egypt: new and old,” The Economist March 20th 
(1999): S1-18. 
6.  World Bank. “World Development Indicators,” . Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1999. 
7.  Rannan-Eliya, R. P., Nada, K. H., Kamal, A. M., and Ibrahim Ali, A. “Egypt 
National Health Accounts 1994/95,” . Cairo and Boston: Department of 
Planning, Ministry of Health and Population, Arab Republic of Egypt, and Data 
for Decision Making Project, Harvard School of Public Health, 1998. 
8. Ministry  of  Economy.  “Monthly Economic Digest Feb. 2000,” . Cairo: Ministry 
of Economy, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000. 
9.  Ali Dau, K., and El-Amach, H. M. “Social Safety Nets: The Social Development 
Fund in Egypt,” in Kanaan, T. H., ed., The Social Effects of Economic 
18 Adjustment on Arab Countries. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 
1997. 
10.  United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report. Gender 
and human development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
11.  Rafeh, N. “Private Health Insurance in Egypt,” in Schieber, G. J., ed., 
Innovations in Health Care Financing. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Discussion Paper No. 365, 1997. 
12.  Fargues, P. “State policies and the birth rate in Egypt: from socialism to 
liberalism,” Population and Development Review 23 (1997): 115-138. 
13.  World Bank. “Project appraisal document for a proposed credit in the amount 
of SDR 66.8 million (US$90.0 million equivalent) to the Arab Republic of Egypt 
for a health sector reform program”. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998. 
14.  Sallam, I. “Health care in Egypt,” Lancet 352 (1998): 1632. 
15.  Hertz, E., Hebert, J. R., and Landon, J. “Social and environmental factors and 
life expectancy, infant mortality, and maternal mortality rates: results of a 
cross-national comparison,” Soc Sci Med 39 (1994): 105-114. 
16.  Department of Planning/Ministry of Health and Population/ Arab Republic of 
Egypt and Data for Decision Making Project/Harvard School of Public Health. 
“Health Care Utilization and Expenditures in the Arab Republic of Egypt 1994-
95,” . Cairo and Boston: Ministry of Health and Population, Arab Republic of 
Egypt, and Harvard School of Public Health, 1998. 
17.  Department of Planning/Ministry of Health and Population/ Arab Republic of 
Egypt and Data for Decision Making Project/Harvard School of Public Health. 
“Egypt Provider Survey Report,” . Cairo and Boston: Ministry of Health, Arab 
Republic of Egypt and Harvard School of Public Health, 1998. 
18.  Figueras, J., Saltman, R., and Mossialos, E. “Challenges in evaluating health 
sector reform: an overview” . London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1997. 
19.  Barnum, H., Kutzin, J., and Saxenian, H. “Incentives and provider payment 
methods,” International Journal of Health Planning and Management 10 
(1995): 23-45. 
20.  OECD. “The Reform of Health Care. A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD 
Countries” . Paris, France: OECD, 1992. 
19 21.  Le Grand, J. “Financing Health Care,” in Feachem, Z., Hensher, M., and Rose, 
L., eds., Implementing Health Sector Reform in Central Asia. Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1998. 
22.  Saltman, R. B., and Figueras, J. European Health Care Reform. Analysis of 
Current Strategies. Copenhagen, Denmark: WHO, Regional Office for Europe, 
1997. 
23.  Mossialos, E., and Le Grand, J. “Cost containment in the EU: an overview,” in 
Mossialos, E., and Le Grand, J., eds., Health Care and Cost Containment in 
the European Union. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999. 
24.  Donaldson, C., and Gerard, K. Economics of Health Care Financing. The 
Visible Hand. London: Macmillan, 1993. 
25.  Wagstaff, A. “Equity in the finance of health care: some international 
comparisons.,” Journal of Health Economics 11 (1992): 361-387. 
26.  Rutten, F. “Policy implications of the COMAC-HSR project,” in van Doorslaer, 
E., Wagstaff, A., and Rutten, F., eds., Equity in the Finance and Delivery of 
Health Care: An International Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
27.  The Economist. “Egypt's mixed signals,” The Economist April 1st (2000): 38. 
28. Abel-Smith,  B.  An Introduction to Health Policy, Planning and Financing. 
London: Longmans, 1994. 
29.  Litvack, J., and Bodart, C. “User fees plus quality equals improved access to 
health care: results of a field experiment in Cameroon,” Soc Sci Med 37 
(1993): 369-383. 
20 